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THE AVAILABILrrY OF TITLE IX DAMAGES FOR
EMPLOYEES AFTER FRANKLIN V. GWINNETT COUNTY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 seeks to
eliminate gender discrimination in educational institutions.2 To
meet this goal, Congress authorized all government agencies that
award funds to educational programs to enforce Title IX by all
lawful means, including the ultimate penalty of fund termination.3
Title IX does not expressly grant private enforcement, such as the
right to bring a cause of action and to collect damages. The Su-
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). The directive is expressed as follows: "No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. at § 1681(a).
2. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982) (describing the
aims of Title IX and congressionally mandated methods of enforcement for reaching those
aims).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988) states as follows:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provi-
sions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be con-
sistent with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
fimancial assistance in connection with which the action is taken . . . . Com-
pliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an ex-
press finding . . . of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such ter-
mination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall
be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such
noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by
law ....
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preme Court, however, has found implied rights to bring private
causes of action4 and to collect damages for intentional violations
of the statute.'
While the issue of whether there is private right of action for
damages under Title IX is settled, who has standing to bring a
claim for damages under Title IX remains unclear. Specifically,
whether an employee of a federally assisted education program
may bring suit for damages under Title IX is unsettled. The Su-
preme Court has held that employees of these education programs
are protected by Title IX,6 but has not expressly determined
whether they may seek damages under Title IX. Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, involving a student's claim for
damages for intentional violation of Title IX, remains the Court's
only statement on whether damages are available under Title IX.
Since the Franklin decision, two district courts have recently
reached opposite conclusions. Bowers v. Baylor University7 held
that employees of federally funded education programs do have a
private right of action for damages' while Wedding v. University
of Toledo9 held the opposite."
Several issues are raised by these differing views. First, does
Title IX allow employees of education programs a right of action
in circumvention of the Title VII administrative procedures that
other employees must follow before bringing a suit for damages?"
Second, if education program employees may bring direct suits for
damages under Title IX, are the substantive standards for proving
gender discrimination the same under both Titles VII and IX?
Finally, are Title IX damage awards subject to any caps similar to
those imposed on Title VII damage recoveries?
This Comment examines the issue of whether employees have
4. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
5. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
6. See North Haven Board of Education, 456 U.S. at 535-36. For further discussion,
see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
7. 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
8. Id. at 145.
9. 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
10. Id. at 204.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988) describes the steps that must be followed before an
aggrieved party may bring suit for employment discrimination. For further discussion, see
infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West 1994) allows damage remedies for employees who
suffer intentional discrimination and places caps on the available compensatory and puni-
tive damages. For further discussion, see infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text
1326 [Vol. 45:1325
1995] FRANKLIN V. GWINNET COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1327
a private right of action for damages under Title IX. Part II ex-
plores the implied right to damages granted in Franklin and pres-
ents the facts and analyses in Bowers and Wedding. Part Hm cri-
tiques the rationale of both cases and explains why the Bowers
decision is a better application of Supreme Court precedent. Final-
ly, Part III focuses on the issues created by granting employees of
federally assisted education programs a right to damages under
Title IX and concludes that these employees should not be except-
ed from the rules of Title VII.
H'. THE IMPLIED RIGHT TO DAMAGES UNDER TITLE IX
A. Cannon v. University of Chicago
In Cannon, the Court first held that a private right of action
exists under Title IX. 3 Geraldine Cannon brought Title IX gender
discrimination claims against the University of Chicago and North-
western University medical schools after being denied admission to
both schools. 4 The Court of Appeals held that Title IX does not
provide a private cause of action, 5 and the Supreme Court re-
versed. However, the question of whether Title IX supports a pri-
vate right of action for damages was not before the Court, as Can-
non sought only equitable relief. 6
B. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools
1. The Facts and Procedural History of Franklin
In Franklin, the Supreme Court held that an implied right of
action under Title IX'7 supports a claim for monetary damages in
cases of intentional violations. 8 Christine Franklin was a student
at North Gwinnett High School in Gwinnett County, Georgia, from
September 1985 through August 1989."9 The Gwinnett County
Public School System operated the high school and received federal
funding. Franklin filed a complaint in December 1988 alleging
13. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 680.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 63 (1992).
20. Id.
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that she had been sexually harassed on a continual basis since the
fall of 1986 by Andrew Hill, a sports coach and teacher at the
school." According to the complaint, Hill engaged Franklin in
sexually explicit conversations, forcibly kissed Franklin in the
school parking lot, and ultimately subjected Franklin to coerced
sexual intercourse. 2 The complaint further alleged that school of-
ficials became aware of and investigated Hill's sexual harassment
of Franklin and other students, but took no steps to stop the behav-
ior and discouraged Franklin from pressing chargesY Hill re-
signed on April 14, 1988 upon the condition that all legal matters
pending against him be dropped, and the school subsequently
closed its investigation. 4
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia dismissed Franklin's complaint on the grounds that mone-
tary damages are not available under Title IX.' The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.26 The Court of Appeals
based its decision on three grounds. First, the court noted that the
analysis of Title IX and Title VF had developed similarly, and
binding precedent existed within the Eleventh Circuit holding that
Title VI does not support a claim for damages.2" Thus, the court
felt obliged to hold that Title IX also does not allow claims for
damages.29 Second, the court reasoned that Title IX was enacted
pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause power and that such stat-
utes frequently limit remedies to equitable relief. Finally, the court
stated that absent clear direction from Congress or the Supreme
Court on this issue, it was reluctant to authorize the award of
damages in Title IX actions."0
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 64.
24. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 64 (1992).
25. Id.
26. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, or national origin" by "any person or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Id. Title VI's enforcement provision is substantially similar to that of Title IX. Id.
§ 2000d-1; see also note 3.
28. Franklin, 119 F.2d at 620-21.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 622.
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2. Holding and Rationale of the Supreme Court
As stated above, the Supreme Court reversed and held that
Title IX does support a private right of action for damages.31 The
Court first stated that the question of available remedies for a
statutorily granted right of action is "analytically distinct" from the
question of whether an underlying right of action exists.32 Having
found in Cannon that a private right of action under Title IX ex-
ists, the Court proceeded to analyze the issue before it under the
presumption that, absent an express indication by Congress to the
contrary, all remedies are available under a granted right of ac-
tion?3
The Court examined whether Congress intended to limit avail-
able Title IX remedies by focusing on both the "state of the law"
prior to the enactment of Title IX and congressional action subse-
quent to the Cannon decision. 4 Since Title IX is silent on wheth-
er a private right of action exists and what remedies are available
for any suits, reliance on express legislative intent was deemed
fruitless by the Court.35 Instead, the Court noted that both before
and after the enactment of Title IX, it had consistently held that
where Congress was silent on whether a remedy is available, denial
of remedies was the exception rather than the rule.36 Within the
decade immediately preceding the enactment of Title IX, the Court
upheld an implied right of action on six occasions and approved a
damages remedy in three of these cases.37 Since Congress was
operating with full knowledge of the Court's presumption in favor
of finding rights of action and all available remedies, the absence
of any limiting language in Title IX suggested that the legislative
31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65-66.
33. Id. at 66. The Court cited a long line of precedent beginning with English com-
mon law and ending with Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Id at 1033. The Hood
decision looked approvingly on this line of precedent in enunciating the principle that
where a right of action exists under the Constitution or federal law, the federal courts
have the power to grant appropriate relief. Id.
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Franklin v. Gwirmett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) (citing Superinten-
dent of Ins. of New York -v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 5 (1971)); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 393 U.S.
229 (1969) (allowing damages); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 398 U.S. 191 (1967) (allowing damages); J.1.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (allowing damages)).
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branch did not intend to limit remedies under the statute.38
The Court buttressed this conclusion by analyzing congressio-
nal activity after the Cannon decision.39 Congress passed two
amendments to Title IX after Cannon.' The Civil Rights and
Remedies Equalization Amendment41 was read as validating Can-
non by providing that "remedies (including remedies both at law
and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent
as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit
against any public or private entity other than a state" in Title IX
actions. 2 While Congress did not expressly state the nature of the
available remedies, it was also silent as to any limits on remedies.
The Court assumed that Congress did not intend to limit available
remedies in Title IX because it did not explicitly do so. Congress
enacted the amendment with full knowledge of both the Court's
finding an implied right of action under Title IX and the presump-
tion that all remedies are available for causes of action absent the
expression of contrary intent.43
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987' also gave support
to the Court's conclusion.45 The Act did not alter existing rights
of action under Title IX although it broadened the scope of cover-
age afforded by Title IX and other antidiscrimination statutes.'
Once again, no limits were placed on remedies, allowing the Court
to conclude that since Congress knew of the presumption in favor
of granting all remedies for a statutory right of action, it did not
intend to limit available remedies under Title IX.47
Having concluded that Congress did not intend to limit reme-
dies available in Title IX actions, the Court rejected three argu-
ments against extending the presumption in favor of all forms of
relief to Title IX cases." The Court first rejected the argument
that by awarding damages, federal courts were impermissibly tread-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988).
42. Franldin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72-73 (1992) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1988)).
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687-88 (1988)).
45. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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ing into areas of power reserved for the executive and legislative
branches of government.49 The Court stated that the congressional
grant of a right to a cause of action grants the judiciary the power
to hear a case; the discretion to award appropriate relief does not
increase the jurisdictional reach of the judiciary.0 It was next ar-
gued that since Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spend-
ing Clause power, it was appropriate to limit remedies for even
intentional violations of the statute.5 ' The Court rejected this argu-
ment on the grounds that remedies are limited only for unintention-
al violations of Spending Clause statutes.52 Damages are not per-
mitted for unintentional violations because the defendant lacks
notice that it will be liable for a monetary award; in the case of an
intentional violation, adequate notice is served that monetary liabili-
ty may attach5 3 Finally, it was argued that Title IX remedies
should be limited to backpay and prospective relief.54 The Court
rejected this argument on two grounds. First, before using equitable
remedies, the adequacy of remedies at law must be determined.
Second, neither suggested remedy would suffice in this case since
Franklin was a student who had already graduated. 6
Justices Scalia concurred in the judgment and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Scalia argued that
congressional silence as to remedies is irrelevant in cases where the
Court implies rights of action because in such situations Congress
does not know it is creating rights of action, so it should not be
expected to enumerate remedies.57 Scalia further argued that if
rights of action are implied by the judiciary, nothing restricts judi-
cial power to limit the availability of remedies. 8 Although dis-
agreeing with the majority's reasoning, he concurred in the result
based on the enactment of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Amendment of 1986, which he viewed as an implicit acknowledg-
ment by Congress that damages are available in actions arising
49. Id. at 1037.
50. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1992).
51. Id. at 74.
52. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29
(1981)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 75.
55. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (citing Whitehead
v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 150 (1891)).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 77 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. See id.
13311995]
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under Title IX. 9 The implication that damages are available was
evident from the withdrawal of states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity from Title IX and other antidiscrimination suits' and the
availability of damages in law or equity from states to the same
extent that these damages are available under Title IX from private
citizens.61 By stating that damages for Title IX violations are
available against states to the same extent as they are from private
citizens, Congress effectively acknowledged that a right to damages
exists under Title IX.
C. Applying Franklin in the Employment Context
In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,62 the Supreme
Court held that Title IX allows an employee who directly partici-
pates in or directly benefits from federal programs, grants, loans, or
contracts to bring a private right of action for gender discrimina-
tion.63 The issue of whether an employee may bring a Title IX
suit for damages was not before the Court,' although this issue
was tangentially addressed ten years later in Franklin. Since Frank-
lin, two district courts have examined this issue and have reached
opposite conclusions.
1. Bowers v. Baylor Universit'65
Pam Bowers was hired as the coach of the Baylor University
women's basketball team.' Bowers initially contacted the Office
of Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education in March of
1989 to complain about the disparate resource allocation between
the men's and women's basketball programs, including the differ-
ing terms and conditions of employment of the men's and wom-
59. Id. at 78.
60. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 78 (1992) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7(a)(1) (1988)).
61. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1988)).
62. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
63. Id. at 520-21,
64. North Haven dealt with the validity of employment regulations governing sex dis-
crimination issued by the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. at
517-20. The Court held that Title IX was intended to ban employment discrimination at
federally-funded education programs. Id. 535-36. Therefore, HEW [now Department of
Health and Human Services] has the authority to promulgate sex discrimination in em-
ployment regulations under the Title. Id. at 538.
65. 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
66. Id at 143.
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en's basketball coaches.67 Baylor was aware of Bowers' griev-
ances at approximately the time of the complaint to the OCR. 8
In 1993, Baylor fired Bowers. 9 Immediately after Bowers
filed a complaint with both the Office of Civil Rights and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Baylor notified Bow-
ers that she would be reinstated under either the employment terms
that had existed since 1979 or a two year-written contract." After
fruitless negotiations over the written contract, Bower was rehired
under the same terms by which she had been. employed since
1979." Bowers continued her employment complaints with the
federal agencies after being reinstated. 2
In an employment evaluation given on August 30, 1993,
Baylor told Bowers that a winning season was a prerequisite for
her continued employment.' Bowers was given written notifica-
tion on or about March 28, 1994 that her employment would be
terminated on May 31, 1994 due to a losing record during her
career with Baylor.74 Bowers subsequently brought a suit based
exclusively on alleged Title IX violations by Baylor and requested
remedies at both law and equity.'
Baylor filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.76 Specifi-
cally, Baylor argued that Title IX does not grant employees a
private right of action for damages?7 The district court briefly
stated the facts and holdings of Cannon, North Haven, and Frank-
lin and concluded that based on this line of precedent, the Supreme
Court would uphold the right of employees to bring private suits
for damages under Title IX.7 While the district court suggested it
might agree with Baylor's reasoning on this issue,79 it felt that
the pattern of Supreme Court precedent necessitated a finding of an
employee's private right of action for damages under Title IX and
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 143 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 143-44 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
76. Id. at 144.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 144-45.
79. Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
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therefore denied Baylor's 12(b)(6) motion."
2. Wedding v. University of Toledo8
In Wedding, court considered the University of Toledo's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Mary Ellen Wedding's claims of Title
IX gender discrimination, age discrimination under an Ohio statute,
and common law deceit." Wedding sought damages under Title
VII for gender discrimination and additional damages under Title
IX.83 The University of Toledo argued that Title IX does not sup-
port an employee's private right of action for damages because
Title IX is preempted by Title VII in the area of employer sex
discrimination.84
The district court stated the facts and holdings of both Cannon
and North Haven, but ignored Franklin and its implications on this
issue." The court then examined both Title VII and Title IX, not-
ing that while both prohibited gender discrimination, only Title VII
provided "a comprehensive scheme for an aggrieved individual to
enforce the prohibition of employment discrimination."86 The court
further observed that while an employee has an express private
right of action for damages under Title VII, the preferred method
of enforcement is to exhaust all available administrative remedies
before filing suit. 7 The court concluded that Title VII preempts
Title IX on the grounds that if the implied right of action under
Title IX allowed employees to assert claims for damages, then the
"very comprehensive, detailed, and express provisions of Title VII
could be completely avoided," a result not intended by Congress in
enacting Title IX.8
The court buttressed its conclusion by examining the legisla-
tive history of Title VII. 9 Citing a House Report on the 1972
Amendments9' which stated that the Amendments did not alter
80. Id.
81. 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
82. Id. at 202. Wedding also filed a gender discrimination claim under Title VII and a
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, which the defendant did not
challenge with a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 202-03.
86. Wedding v. University of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
87. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 203-04 (citing H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., (1972) as reprint-
ed in 1972 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2137, 2154).
90. Along with enacting Title IX, the 1972 Amendments made Title VII applicable to
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existing rights granted to individuals by previous legislation, the
court reasoned that since Title VII existed before Title IX, it was
not altered by Title IX and remained the sole statute under which
employees have a private right of action for damages."
Im. MANDATORY AUTHORrY AND POLICY ANALYSES OF BOWERS
AND WEDDING
A. Bowers and Wedding: Following Precedent
The Supreme Court has decided three cases in the area of
suits and remedies available under Title IX - Cannon, North
Haven Board of Education, and Franklin. Each case successively
has broadened the scope of Title IX. In order for a lower federal
court properly to decide an issue in this area, this broadened scope
must be considered. While the Bowers court reflected on the Su-
preme Court holdings and analyses of these three cases,' the
Wedding court ignored Franklin and its implications for whether
employees have a private right of action for damages under Title
IX. While Wedding accurately depicted the legislative intent under-
lying Title VII, by ignoring Franklin it failed to comprehend the
broad scope that Congress intended for Title IX. Moreover, the
Wedding court failed to adhere to binding precedent.
The logic of the Franklin opinion as to whether a private right
of action for damages exists under Title IX applies with equal
force to employees or nonemployees. Under the majority's rea-
soning in Franklin, if there is a private right of action, then dam-
age remedies are available unless a contrary legislative intent has
been expressed.93 The Court found in North Haven that employees
are entitled to bring suits under Title IX.9" Nothing in Title IX
limits available remedies nor does Title VII state that it is the
exclusive means of redress for an employee who suffers gender
discrimination.95 Thus, under the basic logic of the Franklin ma-
state and local government employees. See id. at 203-04.
91. Wedding v. University of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
92. Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 144-45 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
93. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992).
94. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1982) (focusing on the use
of "person" in Title IX rather than a more narrow term such as "student").
95. See Storey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin System, 600 F. Supp. 838
(W.D. Wis. 1985), which discussed the availability to employees of remedial measures
13351995]
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jority, damage remedies are available to employees who bring Title
IX suits.
Additional support for this conclusion can be found by look-
ing to congressional activity subsequent to North Haven, just as the
Court looked to such activity subsequent to Cannon to support its
holding in Franklin. Both the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Amendment of 1986 and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
were enacted by a Congress having full knowledge of both the
Cannon and North Haven holdings and the presumption that absent
express congressional intent to the contrary, all remedies are avail-
able for a cause of action. Since these statutes do not limit the
right to bring suit or available remedies, the Franklin majority
cited their enactment as an affirmation of Cannon and an implicit
acknowledgment by Congress that damages are available under
Title IX.' By the same reasoning, since Congress knew of North
Haven and did not seek to deny employees the right to bring Title
IX suits or limit their remedies in either of the subsequent statutes,
damage remedies must exist for employees under Title IX.
The same result is reached under the reasoning of the Franklin
concurrence, which saw the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Act of 1986 as an implicit acknowledgment by Congress that dam-
ages are available under Title IX.' This implicit acknowledgment
was not coupled with restrictions against employees, and since the
goal of the statute was to broaden the scope of Title IX,9s it fol-
lows that Congress intended for employees to also have a right to
damages under Title IX.
The Wedding court made some compelling arguments against
the right of employees to sue for damages under Title IX. By
ignoring Franklin, however, it ignored the broad scope that Con-
gress intended for Title IX. When Franklin is properly considered
other than Title VII. The court also examined the general rule that where two or more
"alternative statutory mechanisms" are available to redress a wrong, the more comprehen-
sive scheme of relief preempts the more general one. Id. at 839-41. Initially, it appears
that since Title VII is the more comprehensive statute, it would preempt Title IX. Such
an analysis is incomplete as it ignores the right conferred by Cannon and North Haven to
employees of federally assisted education programs to bring suit under Title IX. Such
employees would never be able to bring suit under Title IX if it is preempted by Title
VII, a result which leaves North Haven without meaning.
96. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72-73.
97. Id. at 78 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment).
98. Id. at 72-73 (discussing how the amendments to Title IX subsequent to Cannon
and North Haven sought to expand the restrictive view of Title IX taken by the Supreme
Court in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)).
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along with Canon and North Haven, the result becomes clearer.
The Wedding court may disagree with the congressional policy of
broad Title IX application," but it should have avoided substitut-
ing its judgments for what it deemed to be the ill-advised policy of
the legislature." As the Bowers court found, the logic of Can-
non, North Haven, and Franklin in interpreting congressional intent
for Title IX leads to the unavoidable conclusion that employees
may sue for damages under Title IX.
B. Bowers and Wedding: Policy Considerations
Supreme Court interpretations of Title IX and congressional
amendments to the statute indicate the expansive nature of Title
IX. Several issues are raised by the overlap between Titles VII and
IX in coverage of employees of federally assisted education pro-
grams. By adhering to full Supreme Court precedent on this matter,
the Bowers court did not analyze any of these issues. In reaching
its conclusion, the Wedding court considered only the issue of
preemption by Title VII over Title IX.
The first issue raised by the overlap between Titles VII and
IX is whether employees of federally assisted education programs
should be able to avoid the administrative procedure requirements
Qf Title VII to which all other employees must adhere."0 As the
court in Wedding observed, allowing these employees damages
under Title IX creates an avenue for easy circumvention of Title
99. The Wedding court made some reference to the expansive nature of Title IX. Wed-
ding v. University of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (noting how Title
IX had been interpreted to forbid discriminatory actions of educational institutions against
their employees). However, the court felt that the scope of Title IX was limited by Title
VII. Id. at 203-204. As stated above, such an interpretation fails to consider both congres-
sionai and Supreme Court actions that have greatly expanded the coverage of Title IX.
See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
100. See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410-11 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "we should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of
legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action to guide our judicial
decision . . . -); Id. at 383 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (stating that "in a democratic soci-
ety legislatures, not the courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently
moral values of the people."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that
"the legislature, not the judiciary,- is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation, whether it be the Congress . . . . or the States.").
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988) sets forth the procedure that an aggrieved employee
must follow in an action against the employer. In general, an employee may not bring a
private suit until they have first filed a complaint with the EEOC, which then investigates
and attempts to remedy any wrongs through "conference, conciliation, and persuasion"
before deciding whether or not to bring suit. See id. at § 2000e-5(o),(O(I).
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VII, which was expressly created to attack racial, ethnic, religious,
and gender discrimination in employment."°2 The Court noted that
Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) under Title VII to provide every possible chance of
settling a claim of discrimination short of litigation. 3 Allowing
employees to claim damages under Title IX frustrates the congres-
sional intent expressed in Title VII to control the number of em-
ployment discrimination lawsuits. The EEOC is not charged with
handling Title IX claims, thus allowing an employee freely to file
suit for damages under Title IX without first seeking settlement
through administrative channels as Congress intended for Title VII
claims. The expansive nature of Title IX encourages the very in-
crease in litigation that Congress sought to avoid in Title VII.
Second, if such Title IX claims are allowed, the question
arises whether the substantive standards for establishing gender dis-
crimination in employment are the same under Titles VII and IX.
Unlike Title VII, the text of Title IX does not set forth how an
employee may establish gender discrimination by his or her em-
ployer. Similarly, there is a great deal of case law further explain-
ing how an employee may establish a claim of gender discrimina-
tion under Title VII; there is no such interpretive case law regard-
ing employees suing under Title IX. However, a lack of clarity in
the standards necessary to prove a Title IX claim of gender dis-
crimination in employment is not a serious impediment to allowing
employees damages for such claims. The standards that are used
for gender discrimination claims under Title VII could be applied
to Title IX cases dealing with gender discrimination in employ-
ment."° Title VII standards have been applied to other statutes
102. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or discharge or to otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such person's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Id. §
2000e-2(a)(1).
103. See Wedding, 862 F. Supp. at 203 (citing Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44 (1974)).
104. See e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that disparate-impact analysis of proving discrimination under Title VII is applica-
ble to Title IX); Mabry v. Board of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d
311, 316-17 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that substantive standards which govern Title VII
claims should also govern Title IX claims); O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d
632, 642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986) (implying that the substantive standards controlling Title VII
claims also control claims under Title IX). It should be noted that these cases discuss
importing Title VII substantive standards to Title IX in general. Thus, no distinction is
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that seek to eliminate discrimination in employment." While
there has been some hesitancy to apply Title VII standards to these
other statutes,"° such concerns are irrelevant here because both
Title VII and Title IX seek to eliminate gender discrimination, and
proof which establishes such a claim under Title VII should suffice
under Title IX as well."° Thus, while no express standards for
proving gender discrimination in employment exist under Title IX,
this problem can be easily avoided by importing the standards of
Title VII.
A final issue raised by this matter is the amount of damages
that are recoverable under Title IX as opposed to Title VII. Con-
gress allowed Title VII claimants to recover compensatory and
punitive damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.2"5 In the Act,
Congress was very specific as to when an aggrieved party would
have a right of recovery for damages,"° and placed limits on the
recovery of these damages. "' Title IX is void of any discussion
created between the substantive standards applicable under Title IX to employee versus
nonemployee plaintiffs. See also James S. Wrona, Eradicating Sex Discrimination in Edu-
cation: Extending Disparate-Impact Analysis to Title IX Litigation, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1
(1993) (discussing how Title IX suits should use disparate-impact analysis in addition to
disparate-treatment analysis in finding gender discrimination).
105. See Wrona, supra note 104, at 20 (listing several cases which have applied the
substantive standards of Title VII, particularly disparate impact analysis, to the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988)).
106. See id. at 21-22 (discussing the view that since the ADEA allows employers to
make policies based on "reasonable factors other than age," that discrimination under the
ADEA may be proved only through disparate treatment analysis).
107. See id. at 18-20 (discussing cases which have applied Title VII substantive stan-
dards to Title IX claims due mainly to the fact that both statutes seek to eliminate gender
discrimination).
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (West 1994).
109. Section 1981a states:
In an action brought by a complaining party under . . . section 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5 . . . against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrim-
ination . . . prohibited under section 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3, or 2000e-16
of the Act . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages ....
Id. at § 1981a(a)(1) (emphasis added). Since Franklin only allowed Title IX damages for
intentional discrimination, it is assumed that compensatory and punitive damages would
only be available for intentional discrimination against an employee covered by Title IX.
110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a (b)(3) (West 1994) states:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages under this section awarded
for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the
amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for
each complaining party-
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as to limits on available damages; presumably, they could exceed
the limits placed on damages under Title VII. By enacting this
statute, Congress has expressed a clear intent not only to limit the
amount of employment discrimination litigation,"' but to also
limit the amount of recoveries from such litigation. The overlap be-
tween Titles VII and IX conceivably allows employees covered by
Title IX to avoid the limits on damages that apply to all other
aggrieved employees.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an area of law as important as gender discrimination in
employment, Congress should clarify whether employees of feder-
ally assisted education programs may receive damages under Title
IX as well as Title VII. The pattern of legislative and judicial
activity expanding Title IX coverage conflicts with the underlying
intent of Title VII to restrict both litigation and damages. This has
caused unnecessary confusion in the judiciary, which in turn creates
the likelihood of ineffective enforcement of the gender antidiscrim-
ination laws. Rather than remaining silent, Congress should ex-
pressly declare whether employees are entitled to damages in ac-
tions brought under Title IX. Unless some meaningful justification
is made as to why employees covered by Title IX may elect to
avoid the strictures of Title VII, Congress should specify that they
must follow Title VII's comprehensive scheme of redress and
limits on damages. This is necessary in order to avoid the wasteful
costs, of increased litigation and excess damages, costs which Con-
gress sought to limit through Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Therefore, the Court or Congress should expressly limit
employees covered by Title IX to Title VII damages.
MICHAEL A. CULLERS*
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer
than 101 employees . . $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer
than 201 employees . . . $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer
than 501 employees . . . $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employ-
ees . . . $300,000.
111. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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author wishes to thank Professor Jonathan Entin, Eleanor Metzger, and Morris Hawk for
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